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Abstract—Mixed-criticality scheduling theory (MCSh) was de-
veloped to allow for more resource-efficient implementation of
systems comprising different components that need to have their
correctness validated at different levels of assurance. As originally
defined, MCSh deals exclusively with pre-runtime verification
of such systems; hence many mixed-criticality scheduling algo-
rithms that have been developed tend to exhibit rather poor
survivability characteristics during run-time. (E.g., MCSh allows
for less-important (“LO-criticality”) workloads to be completely
discarded in the event that run-time behavior is not compliant
with the assumptions under which the correctness of the LO-
criticality workload should be verified.) Here we seek to extend
MCSh to incorporate survivability considerations, by proposing
quantitative metrics for the robustness and resilience of mixed-
criticality scheduling algorithms. Such metrics allow us to make
quantitative assertions regarding the survivability characteristics
of mixed-criticality scheduling algorithms, and to compare dif-
ferent algorithms from the perspective of their survivability. We
propose that MCSh seek to develop scheduling algorithms that
possess superior survivability characteristics, thereby obtaining
algorithms with better survivability properties than current ones
(which, since they have been developed within a survivability-
agnostic framework, tend to focus exclusively on pre-runtime
verification and ignore survivability issues entirely).
I. INTRODUCTION
Many safety-critical systems are required to have their cor-
rectness validated (in some cases, formally verified) prior to
their deployment; in some application domains such as civilian
aviation, such a priori validation is mandated by statutory
certification requirements. For safety-critical systems in which
different functionalities need to have their correctness vali-
dated to different degrees of assurance, an approach towards
doing such validation that was first advocated by Vestal [1] has
garnered a lot of attention in the real-time scheduling theory
community.1 We consider here the preemptive uniprocessor
scheduling of systems of independent sporadic tasks that
are represented using the Vestal model [1]. Each task τi is
characterized by the parameters (Ti, C
L
i , C
H
i , χi), where T1
denotes its period, χi ∈ {LO, HI} its criticality with LO
denoting lower criticality than HI, and CLi and C
H
i its LO
and HI criticality worst-case execution time (WCET) estimates
(with CHi ≥ CLi ). The intuition behind this model is that
HI-criticality tasks need to have their correctness validated
at a higher level of assurance than LO-criticality tasks. The
CHi and C
L
i parameters represent different estimates, made at
1Some familiarity is assumed here on the part of the reader with the mixed-
criticality scheduling model introduced by Vestal [1] and reviewed in, e.g. [2].
levels of assurance consistent with the higher and lower levels
of assurance respectively, of the actual (unknown) WCET of
task τi. Since we only need to validate each task at a level of
assurance consistent with its own specified criticality level, the
correctness criterion in verification of this system translates to
the requirement that
a. if every job of every task τi completes execution within C
L
i
units of execution then all jobs should meet their deadlines;
and
b. if a job of some task τi fails to complete execution despite
having executed for CLi time units, then all jobs of each
HI-criticality task τi should receive up to C
H
i units of
execution by their respective deadlines. (Since this situation
violates the assumptions under which LO-criticality verifi-
cation is required to be performed, no requirements are
placed upon the execution of jobs of LO-criticality tasks).
The original Vestal model proved very successful in iden-
tifying some of the core challenges that arise in resource-
efficient scheduling of mixed-criticality systems, and spawned
a large body of research that proposed solutions to some of
these challenges. However, this model has met with some
criticism (see, e.g, [3], [4]) that it does not match expectations
of systems developers in some important aspects — most of
these criticisms are with regards to the behavior of proposed
mixed-criticality scheduling algorithms in the event that some
jobs execute beyond their LO-criticality WCET estimates. Here
we seek to better understand some of these concerns, and
construct a formal framework within which to address these
concerns.
Organization. The remainder of this document is organized
in the following manner. The distinct concepts of pre-run-time
verification and run-time survivability are both foundational
to the analysis and evaluation of high-integrity safety-critical
systems; we seek to highlight the relationship (in particular,
emphasizing the difference) between these two concepts in
Section II. In Section III we formally present the Vestal
model for mixed-criticality workloads and briefly review some
related work that forms the basis of the remainder of this
paper. Our major technical contributions are to be found in
Section IV, where we explain our proposed approach for
extending the Vestal model to incorporate considerations of
run-time survivability. We conclude in Section V with a brief
summary, and a discussion on future research directions.
Fig. 1. Assume-Guarantee Specifications
II. VERIFICATION VERSUS SURVIVABILITY
The issue of ensuring correctness in high-integrity safety-
critical systems may be considered from two rather distinct
perspectives: (i) (pre-run-time) verification, and (ii) survivabil-
ity. Pre-run-time verification of a safety-critical system is the
process of ensuring, prior to deployment, that the run-time
behavior of the system will be consistent with expectations.
In one commonly used formal framework for pre-run-time
verification (see Figure 1), assumptions are made regarding
the kinds of circumstances that will be encountered by the
system during run-time, and guarantees specified that the run-
time behavior of the system is required to satisfy (provided
that the assumptions hold). In contrast, survivability addresses
expectations of system behavior in the event that the assump-
tions fail to fully hold (in which case a “fault” may be stated
to have occurred during run-time). Survivability may further
be considered to comprise two notions — robustness and
resilience. Informally, the robustness of a system is a measure
of the degree of fault it can tolerate without compromising on
the quality of service it offers; resilience, by contrast, refers
to the degree of fault for which it can provide degraded yet
acceptable quality of service.
The model proposed by Vestal [1], and much of the subse-
quent scheduling theory that has been developed based upon
this model, are designed to deal with verification, not surviv-
ability. Hence many mixed-criticality scheduling algorithms
that have been proposed (including the ones in [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12]) drop all LO-criticality tasks upon the
event of any job executing beyond its LO-criticality WCET
estimate.
We would like to emphasize that from the verification
perspective such job-dropping has no adverse implications for
the LO-criticality workload: in verifying the correctness of
the LO-criticality workloads, we assume that the LO-criticality
WCET estimates are never exceeded (and hence such dropping
will never occur). Therefore, in considering verification of
mixed-criticality systems there is no particular benefit to-
wards incorporating survivability properties into the run-time
scheduling algorithms, whereas doing so tends to result in
algorithms with more complex descriptions and run-time se-
mantics. Consequently mixed-criticality scheduling algorithms
have tended to be designed without incorporating survivability,
and are emphatically not survivable from the perspective of
the LO-criticality workloads: even the smallest violation of
the assumption that LO-criticality WCET estimates will not
be exceeded results in the entire LO-criticality workload being
dropped. Much of the criticism that has been directed at
mixed-criticality scheduling theory that is based on the Vestal
model can be traced to these poor survivability properties
of the proposed algorithms. Some efforts have recently been
made at designing mixed-criticality scheduling algorithms that
exhibit some forms of survivability (see, for example [13],
[14], [15], [16]); however, these are all ad hoc approaches
towards incorporating some properties that are desirable from
the perspective of survivability and do not attempt to formally
define and quantify survivability — to our knowledge, Burns et
al. [17] represents a first effort at doing so. The focus in [17]
is on defining task models that allow for the representation
of robustness properties (in particular, HI-criticality tasks are
defined as being robust to the dropping of individual jobs in
the sense that the functionality of the task is not compromised
upon such dropping, and algorithms are derived in [17] for
scheduling systems comprising such tasks that judiciously
select jobs to be dropped in order to not need to discard
any LO-criticality tasks). We, in contrast, do not address
the modeling aspect at all but instead explore scheduling-
centric approaches for achieving survivability, by proposing
a framework for the development scheduling algorithms and
analyses that accommodate the concepts of robustness and
resilience in a model-agnostic manner. Specifically, we seek to
define quantitative metrics of robustness and resilience that are
applicable to the Vestal model [1] (which, as previously stated,
does not incorporate survivability in its current form), and to
correlate these metrics to the resulting run-time survivability
guarantees of the system.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the scheduling of systems of independent dual-
criticality implicit-deadline sporadic tasks upon a shared pre-
emptive processor. We assume that a dual-criticality implicit-
deadline sporadic task τi is characterized by the parameters
(Ti, C
L
i , C
H
i , χi), where χi ∈ {LO, HI} denotes its criticality,
CLi and C
H
i its LO and HI criticality WCETs, and Ti its period.
We require that CLi ≤ CHi . Some additional notation: we let
uLi
def
= (CLi /Ti) and u
H
i
def
= (CHi /Ti) denote the LO-criticality
and HI-criticality utilizations of task τi.
System behaviors. Since the period parameter of a sporadic
task denotes the minimum (rather than exact) separation
between successive jobs generated by the task, and WCET’s
merely denote estimated upper bounds on the actual execution
time needed to complete executing a job of the task, a single
sporadic task system may exhibit different behaviors during
different executions. The criticality level of a behavior is
determined by how much execution is needed by the jobs in
order to complete execution in that behavior:
• If every job completes upon executing for no more
than the LO-criticality WCET estimate of the task that
generated it, then the behavior is defined to be a LO-
criticality behavior.
1) Each τi initially executes at a constant rate θ
L
i . That is,
at each time-instant it is executing upon θLi fraction of a
processor.
2) If a job of any task τi does not complete despite having
received CLi units of execution (equivalently, having
executed for a duration (CLi /θ
L
i )), then
• All LO-criticality tasks are immediately discarded,
and
• Each HI-criticality task henceforth executes at a con-
stant rate θHi .
Fig. 2. The run-time scheduling strategy used by Algorithm MC-Fluid
• Every behavior that is not a LO-criticality behavior in
which every job completes upon executing for no more
than the HI-criticality WCET estimate of the task that
generated it is defined to be a HI-criticality behavior.
• All other behaviors are erroneous.
Correctness criterion. We define an algorithm for scheduling
MC task systems to be correct if it is able to schedule any
system in such a manner that both the following properties are
satisfied:
• during all LO-criticality behaviors of the system, each job
receives enough execution between its release time and
deadline to complete execution, and
• during all HI-criticality behaviors of the system, all HI-
criticality jobs receive enough execution between their
release time and deadline to complete execution.
Some additional notation. We now describe some notation
that we will be using later in this document. We will let
τ denote a collection of n dual-criticality implicit-deadline
sporadic tasks that are to be scheduled upon a preemptive
unit-speed processor. As a general rule, τ with a subscript
(as in τi) denotes an individual task in τ ; however, τH ⊆ τ
(τL ⊆ τ , respectively) denotes the collection of all the HI-
criticality tasks (all the LO-criticality tasks, resp.) in τ .
Various system utilization parameters are defined for τ as
follows:
ULL
def
=
∑
τi∈τL
uLi
ULH
def
=
∑
τi∈τH
uLi
UHH
def
=
∑
τi∈τH
uHi
A. Fluid scheduling of dual-criticality systems
The MC-Fluid scheduling algorithm [10], [12] was designed
for scheduling dual-criticality implicit-deadline sporadic task
systems upon identical multiprocessor platforms under the
fluid scheduling model, which allows for schedules in which
individual tasks may be assigned a fraction ≤ 1 of a processor
(rather than an entire processor, or none) at each instant in
time. (Although MC-Fluid was designed as a multiprocessor
scheduling algorithm, we will be applying it to scheduling
upon uniprocessor platforms; hence our use of the results
in [10], [12] initialize the number of processors to 1: m← 1.)
MC-Fluid operates in the following manner. Prior to run-
time, it computes LO-criticality and HI-criticality execution
rates θLi and θ
H
i for each task τi ∈ τ such that the run-time
scheduling algorithm depicted in Figure 2 constitutes a correct
scheduling strategy for τ . An algorithm for computing suitable
values for the θLi and θ
H
i parameters is presented in [10]. It
is shown in [10] that this approach has a speedup factor no
worse than (1 +
√
5)/2 ≈ 1.62: if a given task system τ can
be scheduled correctly by an optimal clairvoyant scheduler
upon an m-processor platform, then the run-time algorithm of
Figure 2, with values for the θLi and θ
H
i parameters computed
in the manner defined in [10], will successfully schedule τ
upon an m-processor platform in which each processor is
faster by a factor of 1.62. A superior speedup bound was
subsequently proved in [12]: it was shown that if a task system
can be scheduled correctly by an optimal clairvoyant scheduler
upon an m-processor platform then the run-time algorithm of
Figure 2, with values for the θLi and θ
H
i parameters computed
as in [10], will in fact successfully schedule τ upon an m-
processor platform in which each processor is faster by a factor
of 4
3
(since 4
3
< (1+
√
5)/2, this is a superior speedup bound).
A somewhat simpler (and more efficient, in terms of run-time
computational complexity) algorithm than the one in [10] for
computing θLi and the θ
H
i parameters was presented in [12]
– this simpler algorithm, called Algorithm MCF, is presented
in Figure 3 (specialized for uniprocessors – i.e., for m← 1).
It was also shown in [12] that the 4
3
’rds speedup bound holds
even when the θLi and the θ
H
i parameters are computed using
Algorithm MCF.
IV. INCORPORATING SURVIVABILITY INTO MCF
In this section we describe how quantitative notions of
survivability — robustness and resilience — may be incorpo-
rated into the Vestal model, and how Algorithm MCF may be
modified in order to provided specified degrees of robustness
and resilience.2
From the perspective of survivability, it is perhaps helpful
to interpret the WCET parameters of HI-criticality and LO-
criticality tasks differently. We can look upon the WCET
parameters of HI-criticality tasks as assumptions, and the
2We would like to point out that we are using Algorithm MCF as an
examplar of our approach towards quantifying survivability primarily because
these concepts appear easier to highlight for fluid scheduling models. Although
these concepts can also be introduced in the context of other mixed-criticality
scheduling algorithms that have been proposed such as AMC [6], EDF-
VD [11], etc., that are not based on fluid-scheduling, discussing them with
respect to these other algorithms requires that many orthogonal concepts also
be dealt with; this obfuscates some of the survivability issues that we seek to
highlight in this document.
1) Define ρ as follows:
ρ← max
{
ULL + U
L
H , U
H
H
}
(1)
2) If ρ > 1 then declare failure; else assign values to the
execution-rate variables as follows:
θHi ← uHi /ρ for all τi ∈ τH (2)
θLi ←


uL
i
θH
i
θH
i
−
(
uH
i
−uL
i
) , if τi ∈ τH
uLi , else (i.e., if τi ∈ τL)
(3)
3) If ∑
τi∈τ
θLi ≤ 1 (4)
then declare success else declare failure
Fig. 3. Algorithm MCF
WCET parameters of LO-criticality tasks as the corresponding
guarantees: if each HI-criticality job completes upon executing
for no more than the LO-criticality WCET estimate of the task
that generated it, then each LO-criticality job is guaranteed an
execution of at least the LO-criticality WCET estimate of the
task that generated it. In other words, by assuming that each
job of each HI-criticality task completes upon executing for
no more than its LO-criticality WCET estimate, we are able
to guarantee each LO-criticality job an amount of execution
up to its LO-criticality WCET estimate.
For incorporating survivability into the Vestal model it is
equivalent, and perhaps more convenient, to think of a server
of bandwidth/ capacity uLi
def
= (CLi /Ti) as being associated
with each LO-criticality task τi: all the jobs that are generated
by τi are executed by this server. (Hence if some such job has
a WCET > CLi , the impact of this only falls upon future jobs
that are generated by this task τi.) This is the approach we will
take in this paper, associating a server with each LO-criticality
task. Under conventional mixed-criticality scheduling (e.g.,
the run-time algorithm of Figure 2), these servers that are
associated with the LO-criticality tasks are terminated if any
job of a HI-criticality task executes for more than its LO-
criticality WCET estimate. Survivability can now be defined in
terms of the capacities assigned to these servers in the event of
HI-criticality jobs executing beyond their LO-criticality WCET
estimates:
• A robust scheduler would not change the capacities of
these LO-criticality servers.
• A resilient scheduler would reduce the capacity of these
LO-criticality servers rather than terminating them en-
tirely; the quantitative metrics of resilience that we are
proposing seek to quantify the degree of such reduction.
A running example. For ease of explanation we will introduce
our ideas via illustration upon a simple task system that is
Ti C
L
i
CH
i
χi u
L
i
uH
i
τ1 10 2 − LO 0.2 −
τ2 20 6 − LO 0.3 −
τ3 30 3 18 HI 0.1 0.6
UL
L
= 0.2 + 0.3 = 0.5
UL
H
= 0.1
UH
H
= 0.6
TABLE I
EXAMPLE TASK SYSTEM
depicted in Table I. As can be seen from Table I, this example
task system comprises three tasks, of which two, τ1 and τ2, are
of LO criticality and the third, τ3, is a HI-criticality one. (The
example has only one HI-criticality task by design, to better
explain our proposals for quantitative measures of robustness
and resilience; in Section IV-A, we will explain how to apply
our concepts to task systems with > 1 HI-criticality task.)
The three system-utilization parameters ULL , U
H
L , and U
H
H
for this example are also computed and presented in Table I.
Recall that we are associating a server with each LO-criticality
task: for this example, the servers associated with the LO-
criticality tasks τ1 and τ2 would have bandwidths of u
L
1
def
=
CL1 /T1 and u
L
2
def
= CL2 /T2 respectively; as can be seen from
the table, these are equal to 0.2 and 0.3 respectively.
Algorithm MCF on the example. Applying Algorithm MCF
(Figure 3) to the task system of Table I, we get
ρ← max{0.5 + 0.1, 0.6} = 0.6
Consequently, θH3 = 0.6/0.6 or 1.0, and
θL1 = u
L
1 = 0.2
θL2 = u
L
2 = 0.3
θL3 =
uL3 θ
H
3
θH3 −
(
uH3 − uL3
) = 0.1× 1
1− (0.6− 0.1) =
0.1
0.5
= 0.2
Since
θL1 + θ
L
2 + θ
L
3 = 0.2 + 0.3 + 0.2
which is clearly ≤ 1, Algorithm MCF declares success: the
run-time algorithm of Figure 2 is able to successfully schedule
this system with these computed values for the θLi and θ
H
i
parameters.
Incorporating Robustness. Although our example is correctly
scheduled by Algorithm MCF (as we have seen above), the
system is not at all robust during run-time: if any job of
task τ3 executes beyond C
L
3 (i.e., 3) time units, the run-
time algorithm of Figure 2 immediately discards tasks τ1 and
τ2. To incorporate robustness, we ask the question: “What
is the largest value to which we can increase CL3 such that
Algorithm MCF continues to declare success?” We determine
this value below; once this is computed, we can enhance the
robustness of the system by not discarding τ1 and τ2’s jobs so
long as jobs of τ3 do not execute beyond this computed value
(instead of doing so upon any of τ3’s jobs executing beyond
3 time units).
To compute the desired value, we first observe that Algo-
rithm MCF assigns θH3 the value
uH3 /max(U
L
L + U
L
H , U
H
H ) = 0.6/0.6 = 1
Next, we note that Algorithm MCF declares success as long
as
θL1 + θ
L
2 + θ
L
3 ≤ 1
⇔ uL1 + uL2 + θL3 ≤ 1
⇔ 0.2 + 0.3 + θL3 ≤ 1
⇔ θL3 ≤ 0.5
Hence it is not necessary to have θL3 = 0.2 (as had been
done by Algorithm MCF); we can in fact assign θL3 any value
not exceeding 0.5. Let us therefore choose θL3 ← 0.5; by
Equation 3 in Figure 3, we have
θL3 =
uL3 × θH3
θH3 − (uH3 − uL3 )
≤ 0.5
⇔ θL3 =
uL3 × 1.0
1.0− (0.6− uL3 )
≤ 0.5
⇔ uL3 ≤ 0.5× (0.4 + uL3 )
⇔ uL3 ≤ 0.4
The system would therefore remain correctly schedulable by
Algorithm MCF as long as uL3 ≤ 0.4; equivalently. CL3 ≤
0.4 × T3 = 0.4 × 30 = 12. The system of Table I can
therefore be scheduled in a robust manner by only terminating
the servers associated with τ1 and τ2 only upon some job of
τ3 executing beyond 12 time units (rather than C
L
3 = 3 time
units). A reasonable quantitative metric of the robustness of
this schedule is the ratio of these two quantities: 12/3, or 4.
Achieving Resilience. Robustness refers to the ability of the
system to provide full (i.e., non-degraded) service despite
violation of assumptions; resilience, to the ability to provide
some degraded level of service upon such violation.
Rather than providing robustness so long as τ3’s job’s do
not execute beyond 12 time units but no resilience upon their
doing so, we could instead have chosen to provide a degraded
level of service upon their execution time exceeding CL3 = 3
(clearly this is only beneficial if we can continue to provide
such degraded service upon these jobs executing beyond 12
time units).
We will see below that if we were to reduce the sum of the
capacities of the servers associated with the LO-criticality tasks
τ1 and τ2 to 3/8 (i.e., 0.375) from 0.5 — a reduction to
3
4
of
the desired level of service — upon some job of τ3 executing
for beyond 3 time units, we would not need to degrade service
to τ1 and τ2 any further as long as τ3’s jobs do not exceed their
HI-criticality WCET estimate of 18 time units. This factor of
3
4
may be considered a quantitative metric of the resilience of
this schedule.
We now justify the claim in the paragraph above. First,
we observe (as we had done previously, whilst incorporating
robustness into our example) that since θL1 +θ
L
2 = u
L
1 +u
L
2 =
0.2 + 0.3 = 0.5, we may assign the remaining processor
capacity to θL3 (i.e., we may choose θ
L
3 ← 0.5). Suppose
that a job of τ3 does not complete execution despite having
executed for its LO-criticality WCET estimate of 3 time units.
Since θ3L = 0.5, this implies that this job has been executing
for 3/0.5 or 6 time units, which in turn implies that there is
an interval of duration (T3 − 6) = (30 − 6) = 24 time units
remaining until its deadline. Assigning it a fraction θH3 ← 58 of
the processor over this duration, we see that the total number
of units of computation this job receives by its deadline is
6× θL3 + 24× θH3 = 6× 0.5 + 24×
5
8
= 3 + 15 = 18,
which is equal to its HI-criticality WCET estimate. Upon
τ3 being assigned θ
H
3 =
5
8
of the processor, the remaining
(1− 5
8
) = 3
8
of the processor capacity is assigned to the LO-
criticality servers.
Both Robustness and Resilience. We now discuss how both
robustness and resilience can be achieved simultaneously (in
contrast to the two schemes described above, in each of which
we had achieved one but not the other). Specifically, suppose
that we are given a desired value for the robustness metric:
what degree of resilience can be achieved? We present an
illustrative example below.
Suppose we wish to ensure a robustness of 2: i.e., we seek
robust behavior so long as jobs of τ3 complete upon receiving
no more than 2 × CL3 = 2 × 3 = 6 units of execution, and
resilience thereafter.
As before, we choose θL3 ← 0.5. That is, we start out
assigning τ3 half the processor capacity (and serving τ1 and
τ2 with servers that have capacities 0.2 and 0.3 respectively).
If a job of τ3 does not complete despite having received 6
units of execution,
• It must be the case that this job has executed for 6/0.5
or 12 time units.
• Hence, there is an interval of duration (T3−12) = (30−
12) = 18 before this job’s deadline.
• We assign τ3’s job a
2
3
’rds share of the processor over
this interval, thereby enabling it to get 18× 2
3
or 12 units
of execution by its deadline. (Note that this is enough to
meet its HI-criticality WCET estimate CH3 of 18 by its
deadline.)
• The remaining 1
3
of the processor is apportioned between
the servers serving τ1 and τ2, with their processor shares
reduced to 2/15 and 1/5 respectively (i.e., to 2
3
’rds of
their desired levels of service). The resilience of this
schedule is therefore 2
3
.
This analysis is easily extended to arbitrary values of the
desired robustness. Suppose we desire a robustness of ρo. A
job of τ3 will execute for a duration (C
L
3 × ρo)/0.5 or 6ρ in
order to have completed CL3 × ρo = 3ρo units of execution.
In order to obtain the remaining (CH3 − 3ρo) or (18 − 3ρo)
units of execution by the deadline, we must have
θH3 × (30− 6ρ) = (18− 3ρo)
⇔ θH3 =
18− 3ρo
30− 6ρo =
6− ρo
10− 2ρo
The remaining (1 − θH3 ) processor share is apportioned be-
tween the two LO-criticality servers; since they receive a
(1 − θH3 ) processor share rather than their desired share of
0.2 + 0.3 = 0.5, the degradation in their service (and hence
the resilience) is given by
(
1− θH3
)
÷ 1
2
≡
(
1− 6− ρo
10− 2ρo
)
× 2
≡
( 4− ρo
10− 2ρo
)
× 2
≡
(4− ρo
5− ρo
)
Hence for any selected value of ρo ≥ 1, we are able to
guarantee a resilience
ψ(ρo) =
(4− ρo
5− ρo
)
(5)
Since resilience can only take on non-negative values, it
follows that ρo must be ≤ 4 — for ρo = 5, we have ψo = 0 —
i.e., a non-resilient implementation with robustness factor 4,
which was exactly the first implementation we had evaluated.
Similarly choosing ρ = 1 yields a resilience of 3
4
, which is
the second implementation — resilient but with no robustness
— that we had considered.
More general formulations of resilience.. Let us continue
with the example above: suppose that (as above) we continue
to seek robustness so long as jobs of τ3 complete upon receiv-
ing no more than 6 units of execution, but desire resilience
only if these jobs complete upon receiving between 6 and 15
units of execution. If their execution exceeds 15 units, then no
resilience is expected.
As before, start out with θL3 ← 0.5. Upon executing for 12
time units, a job of τ3 will have received 6 units of execution.
If it does not complete,
• Assign it a 0.6 share of the processor. Over the next
15 time units (i.e., by 12 + 15 = 27 time units of
the job’s arrival), it will have received 15 × 0.6 = 9
units of execution. Hence, it will have received a total of
6 + 9 = 15 units of execution within 27 time units of its
arrival.
Since τ3 receives a 0.6 share of the processor capacity,
this leaves a 0.4 share to be apportioned between the
servers that are servicing the LO-criticality tasks τ1 and
τ2. The capacities assigned to these servers are therefore
reduced to 0.8 of their desired capacities; hence this
schedule has resilience 0.8.
• If the job of τ3 has still not completed execution, assign it
exclusive access to the processor for the remaining 3 time
units, thereby ensuring that it receives 15+3 = 18 units of
execution by its deadline, thereby ensuring that it receives
an amount of execution equal to its HI-criticality WCET
estimate, CH3 , by its deadline). The LO-criticality servers
are suspended/ terminated if this happens; equivalently,
the resilience is zero.
The situation described above may be quantified according to
our robustness and resilience metrics by stating that with a
robustness of 2 we guarantee a resilience of 0.8, while with
a robustness of 5 we guarantee a resilience of 0 (i.e., no
resilience).
A. Generalizing from the example
The running example that we have considered thus far has
served to illustrate how we propose to incorporate quantitative
metrics of robustness and resilience into the Vestal model; in
this section, our proposed approaches are generalized to be
applicable to systems with more than one HI-criticality task.
As previously stated, we are seeking to incorporate surviv-
ability into the mixed-criticality scheduling algorithm MCF,
which is based on the fluid-scheduling paradigm. We modify
Algorithm MCF for this purpose, incorporating servers for the
execution of jobs from LO-criticality tasks.
Let us define an implementation of a system to comprise a
given mixed-criticality task system τ , along with the particular
algorithm that is used to schedule it during run-time. The
correctness criterion for mixed-criticality scheduling requires
that in any correct implementation the bandwidth of the server
for each LO-criticality task τj is ≥ uLj as long as all jobs
of each HI-criticality task τi completes upon executing for at
most CLi units of execution. We now define robustness and
resilience for correct implementations of the task system τ .
Robustness. A correct implementation of τ is said to have
robustness ρ, where ρ is a real number ≥ 1, if the bandwidth
of the server for each LO-criticality task τj remains at least
uLj as long as no job of any HI-criticality task τi executes for
more than ρ× CLi without signaling completion.3
For our example, we have shown that an implementation
that chooses θL3 ← 0.5 and only suspends/ terminates the LO-
criticality servers upon some job of τ3 executing for more than
4× CL3 or 12 units of execution, has a robustness of 4.
Resilience. A correct implementation of τ is said to have
resilience ψ, where ψ is a non-negative real number ≤ 1, if the
bandwidth of the server for each LO-criticality task τj remains
at least ψ × uLj as long as no job of any HI-criticality task τi
executes for more than CHi without signaling completion.
For our example, we have shown that an implementation
that chooses θL3 ← 0.5 and θH3 ← 58 , and reduces the
bandwidth of each LO-criticality server by a factor 3
4
upon
3Alternatively, it is reasonable to bound the execution of jobs of HI-
criticality task τi atmin(ρ×C
L
i
, CH
i
)— i.e., to assume that the HI-criticality
WCET estimates represent truly safe upper bounds on the actual WCET
values. With this interpretation, a fully robust implementation is defined as
an implementation with the robustness parameter equal to infinity: ρ =∞.
some job of τ3 executing for more than C
L
3 = 3 units of
execution, has a resilience of 3
4
.
Both Robustness and Resilience. A correct implementation
of τ is said to have both robustness φ and resilience ψ, if the
bandwidth of the server for each LO-criticality task τj remains
at least ψ × uLj as long as no job of any HI-criticality task τi
executes for more than ρ×CLi without signaling completion.
We showed an implementation of our example system with
robustness 2 and resilience 2
3
. We also derived a relationship
– Expression 5 – between the robustness and resilience pa-
rameter values that are achievable for our example system.
Multiple (ρ, ψ) specifications. A natural generalization is
to specify multiple ordered pairs (ρ1, ψ1), (ρ2, ψ2), . . . with
ρk+1 > ρk and ψk+1 ≤ ψk. The interpretation is that for each
k, we require that the server for each LO-criticality job τj have
bandwidth ≥ ψk × uLk as long as no job of any HI-criticality
task τi executes for more than ρk × CHi without signaling
completion.
We showed an implementation of our example system with
(ρ1, ψ1) = (2, 0.8) and (ρ2, ψ2) = (5, 0). That is, this
implementation
• guarantees full service to the LO-criticality workload as
long as no HI-criticality job executes for more than twice
its LO-criticality WCET estimate;
• guarantees 0.8 of the desired level of service to the
LO-criticality workload as long as each HI-criticality
job executes for between twice and five times its LO-
criticality WCET estimate; and
• makes no guarantees to the LO-criticality workload if any
HI-criticality job executes for more than its LO-criticality
WCET estimate.
(Correct execution of all HI-criticality jobs is assured, provided
each completes upon executing for up to its HI-criti ality
WCET estimate.)
We have seen above that multiple different implementations
of a single system are possible, with the different implemen-
tations characterized by different robustness and resilience pa-
rameters. Many pairs of such implementations are incompara-
ble in the sense that one offers greater robustness and the other,
greater resilience. There is in general a potentially infinite
design space of possible such incomparable implementations
— choosing the most appropriate implementation for a specific
system is a design choice that should be guided by the intended
use of the system.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Pre-runtime verification and run-time survivability are two dis-
tinct aspects of correctness in safety-critical systems. Mixed-
criticality scheduling theory (MCSh) has, thus far, focused
almost exclusively on the verification aspect; in this document
we have described some of our ongoing efforts at extending
MCSh to incorporate survivability considerations. We have
proposed quantitative metrics of both aspects of survivability
– robustness and resilience – for mixed-critical task systems
that are represented using the Vestal model [1]. While we have
illustrated the applicability of our proposed metrics by using
them as the basis for the development of survivable implemen-
tations of a simple mixed-critical system under a particular
mixed-criticality scheduling algorithm (Algorithm MCF), we
are not claiming that our quantitative metrics are the only ones
(or even the best ones) that can be defined. We believe the
choice of metrics is an inherently social process in that buy-
in from a larger research community is needed if the metrics
are to see much use – we hope that this document will spur
some discussion on the choice of metrics for robustness and
resilience, and perhaps yield alternative proposals for metrics.
As stated in Section IV (footnote 2), we have chosen
to illustrate the applicability of our quantitative metrics on
the mixed-criticality scheduling algorithmMCF primarily for
reasons of simplicity: we are by no means suggesting that
we believe it to be the definitive mixed-criticality scheduling
algorithm. As future work we plan to subject other mixed-
critical scheduling algorithms that have been proposed (such as
AMC [6], EDF-VD [11], etc.) to the same form of analysis as
we have done here with Algorithm MCF, and thereby develop
survivable implementations of systems that are based upon
these non-fluid mixed-criticality scheduling algorithms.
Also as future work, we plan to revisit some mixed-
criticality scheduling algorithms such as the ones in [13], [14],
[15], [16] that have previously been proposed for addressing
the non-survivability of traditional mixed-criticality scheduling
algorithms. We will seek to characterize the robustness and
resilience properties of these algorithms on the basis of the
metrics that we have proposed in this paper.
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